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DO FIRMS TIME THEIR POLLUTION ABATEMENT INVESTMENTS
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Summary
In this paper we develop an equilibrium business-cycle model for an economy with both clean and
dirty ~polluting! plants. We conclude that the best time to implement cleaner production technologies
is during a slowdown of the economy. Due to external effects and market failures the timing of pol-
lution abatement investments is not expected to be optimal in the real world. We test the optimality
of the timing of those investments with data for Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA. It appears
that for more than 25 per cent of the sectors pollution abatement investments show significant counter-
cyclical behaviour, while in 10 per cent of the sectors these investments are pro-cyclical.
Key words: business-cycle model, pollution abatement investments, cleaning production, environmen-
tal regulation
1 INTRODUCTION
Governments are often reluctant to attack environmental problems during a re-
cession. In this paper we argue that the best time to clean the environment is
when the economy is slowing down. From the fifties until the beginning of the
seventies, the conventional wisdom was that during a recession the economy
should be stimulated through an increase in government spending. The arguments
used then differ from ours. We believe that the government should concentrate
the implementation of certain public projects in times of recession, but only those
projects which are necessary for long-run growth, such as investments in infra-
structure and the environment. Our motivation is not to dampen output fluctua-
tions per se, but rather to concentrate investment activities in times when the
opportunity costs of doing so are lowest.
There is some empirical evidence ~see e.g. Bean ~1990! and Saint Paul ~1993!!,
that in times of recession firms engage in activities that increase long-run growth
at the cost of a temporary fall in production. With pollution abatement invest-
ments, things are more complicated, since the main reason for firms to undertake
such investments is because they are forced to do so by the government. There-
* Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam ~first author!, FEM/DeWeek ~second author!,
Institute for Environmental Studies ~IVM!, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam ~third author!. We acknowl-
edge the useful remarks of two anonymous referees.
DE ECONOMIST 148, NO. 1, 2000
De Economist 148, 71–86, 2000.
© 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
fore, the government should announce environmental regulation early enough, to
allow firms to time their investments optimally.
In this paper we will first formalise the above mentioned notions in a welfare-
theoretic framework by developing a dynamic stochastic first-best model for the
timing of pollution abatement expenditures. Next, we will test the model with
data for Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. Our theoretical model
describes what the world ideally looks like when there is a central planner with
full information who maximises a social welfare function. The aim of this formal
modelling exercise is to understand how the most important economic mecha-
nisms concerning the timing of pollution abatement expenditures work. In order
to be able to elucidate the most important economic mechanisms at work, the
model will, necessarily, be highly stylised.
The model distinguishes between clean and dirty ~polluting! plants. Consumer-
workers derive utility from consumption and leisure, and disutility from pollu-
tion. We do take into account that the taste for a clean environment and the util-
ity derived from consumption today need not be the same as in the future.
Furthermore, a dirty plant can be transformed into a clean plant, but this has
costs in the form of foregone production. Finally, since most economies are grow-
ing over time it will be necessary to continuously implement cleaner production
techniques to keep the absolute amount of pollution constant. The model captures
this feature by letting some clean plants become dirty in each period. The above
described approach provides us with a natural way to analyse the relation be-
tween current consumption, labour supply, and pollution, and their future values.
We find that, even in this simple set-up, a number of important issues concerning
the timing of environmental policies can be tackled. The model allows us to study
the effects of permanent and transitory demand and technology shocks on pollu-
tion abatement expenditures, as well as the effects of changes in knowledge about
the urgency of environmental problems on optimal environmental policy.
Even when the government takes account of pollution externalities by inter-
nalising them in the prices or by setting emission standards, the optimality result
will only carry over to a decentralised market economy when there are no market
failures like for example capital rationing. Otherwise, there is a potential role for
governments to subsidise pollution abatement policies during a recession. The po-
tential scope for government action, i.e. the importance of possible market fail-
ures, can only be assessed from empirical investigation. We have therefore col-
lected data on pollution abatement investments in different sectors for the US,
Germany, and the Netherlands. We look for a business-cycle effect in the ratio of
abatement investment to total investment. For more than 60 per cent of the coun-
try sectors we do not find a cyclical pattern. A possible reason for this might be
that the timing of environmental regulation itself is non-optimal. Another reason
could be that we have used sectoral data rather than data on the firm level. In
only three sectors do we find a pro-cyclical pattern of pollution abatement ex-
penditures, while in eight sectors those investments move counter-cyclical.
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This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical model.
Section 3 analyses the empirical evidence and section 4 concludes.
2 THEORY
In this section we will develop a formal timing model of a dynamic stochastic
world where preferences for consumption and pollution today can differ from
those for tomorrow. We will show that, under an optimal cleaning policy, the
amount of current output that will be sacrificed for a cleaner future environment
depends upon current and expected future values of utility of consumption, dis-
utility of pollution, and the ratio of output from clean to dirty plants. Finally, we
will show that demand and technology shocks that are perceived to be long-last-
ing have a different impact on current and future pollution than transitory shocks.
2.1 The Model
Consider an economy with two production technologies, a clean-production tech-
nology and a dirty-production technology.1 At the beginning of period t, St infi-
nitely lived consumer-workers are matched to clean-production sites, each pro-
ducing YS units of a composite consumption good.2 For simplicity, we distribute
all workers over the unit interval. So, there are 1-St workers matched to dirty-
production sites, who produce YD units of the composite consumption good. We
assume that clean plants produce more output with the same amount of resources
than dirty plants. So, YS . YD. Note that the problem does not become trivial in
the sense that all workers will be matched to the clean-production sites ~St 5 1!,
because such a transfer will not be without costs, due to investment costs and the
fact that clean plants do not remain clean forever in our model.
Let st be the fraction of clean-producing sites that revert to dirty-producing
sites at the beginning of period t. st can be interpreted in a number of ways.
First, it can be viewed as depreciation, capturing the idea that a constantly grow-
ing economy needs to continuously clean up the production process in order to
keep the same absolute level of pollution. However, st can also be interpreted as
a variable that reflects changes in knowledge or awareness of the impact of cer-
tain production techniques on the environment. We will return to this issue later.
Let Qt be the fraction of workers who move from dirty to clean-production sites
in period t. Then the law of motion for state variable St is given by:
St 1 1 5 ~1 2 st!St 1 Qt ~1 2 St 1 st St! . ~1!
1 This model draws on Davis and Haltiwanger’s ~1990! ‘prototype’ model of job reallocation.
2 There is only one ~variable! input factor St which represents efficiency units of combinations of
labour and capital input. This input factor will be called ‘workers.’
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Equation ~1! gives the number of workers in the clean-production sector in pe-
riod t 1 1 given the number of workers in this sector in period t. The first term at
the right-hand side gives the number of clean plants which remain clean and the
second term gives the fraction of old dirties plus new dirties which become clean-
production sites in the next period. Finally, we will assume that there are opera-
tion costs involved when a dirty-production site is transformed into a clean-pro-
duction site. These costs are equal to one unit of time input by one ~dirt-
producing! worker and can be interpreted as pollution abatement investment. So,
during period t, ~1 2 st!St workers are productive at a clean-production site,
~1 2 Qt! ~1 2 St 1 st St! workers are productive at a dirty-production site and
Qt ~1 2 St 1 st St! workers are transforming dirty plants into clean ones. Instead
of the traditional trade-off between current consumption and future consumption,
the problem here is, how much current consumption is going to be sacrificed for
a cleaner current and future environment. The cleaning activities which go at the
cost of current consumption can be viewed as savings.
We assume for simplicity’s sake that clean plants do not pollute. Let the pol-
lution in period t, Pt, be proportional to output produced at dirty-production sites
in period t. The pollution index Pt can now be written as:
Pt 5 m ~1 2 Qt! ~1 2 St 1 st St!YD , ~2!
where m stands for the emission-output ratio.
Now, let the utility function of all consumer-workers in period t depend on
consumption and pollution, and be given by: U~AtCt,Bt Pt!. Where
UC . 0, UCC , 0, UP , 0, UPP , 0, UCP 5 UPC 5 0 .
Subscripts denote derivatives. At and Bt are utility shifters. A change in At will
be interpreted here as an aggregate demand shock. Bt is a taste for the environ-
ment shifter. Furthermore, At, Bt and st are assumed to follow first-order Markov
processes. We will assume the following functional form for utility:
U~AtCt,BtPt! 5 AtU| ~Ct! 2 Bt f ~Pt! . ~3!
Note that the above concavity assumptions with respect to the utility function
imply:
U| C ~Ct! . 0, U| CC ~Ct! , 0, fP ~Pt! . 0, f PP ~Pt! . 0 .
Finally, it is assumed that consumers’ aggregate consumption in period t is equal
to the aggregate production of the composite consumption good:
Ct 5 ~1 2 st!St YS 1 ~1 2 St 1 stSt! ~1 2 Qt!YD . ~4!
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The ~opportunity! costs of pollution abatement investments are in the form of
foregone production and are represented by the term:
Qt ~1 2 St 1 st St!YD . ~5!
Now, for a given st, a decision has to be made about the fraction of workers at
dirty-production sites that will be allocated to cleaning activities. To keep things
tractable, we will assume that it is always possible to transform dirty into clean-
production sites. We can interpret st now not only as the rate at which existing
clean plants revert to dirty ones, but also as the rate at which clean-production
techniques become available.
At time t, a worker chooses a contingency plan that maximises expected dis-
counted ~life time! utility, i.e. he chooses a sequence of functions maximising
expected discounted ~life time! utility, where the expectation is over the realisa-
tions of the shocks. So the decisions to be carried out in period t 5 1,2,... will
depend upon the information available at that time. Due to the existence of ex-
ternal effects the competitive equilibrium outcome will not be equivalent to the
central planner’s outcome, as the externalities will not be internalised without ad-
ditional government policy. The decentralised competitive equilibrium outcome
could, however, be made compatible with the central planner’s outcome by forc-
ing the market to internalise the externalities, e.g. by levying a ~Pigovian! tax or
by setting emission standards. In order to be able to characterise the reallocation
process in response to demand and allocation shocks, we concentrate on the first-
best solution to the problem ~i.e. where the externalities are fully internalised!,
which is equivalent to the social planner’s solution.
2.2 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner’s problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic program-
ming problem. With V~S,A,B,s! denoting the planner’s value function under the
optimal policy, Bellman’s functional equation can be written as:
V~S,A,B,s! 5 maxQ [ @0,1# @AU| @~1 2 s!SYS 1 ~1 2 S 1 sS! ~1 2 Q!YD#
2 Bf ~P! 1 bE @V~S,A,B,s! u A,B,s##
s.t. S 5 ~1 2 s!S 1 Q ~1 2 S 1 sS! , ~6!
where overlined variables denote next period values and where b is a discount
factor.
For now, we are only interested in how the optimal policy function Q ~S,A,B,s!
reacts to innovations in A, B and s. We will need the following proposition:
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Proposition:
~i! A value function V ~S,A,B,s! exists uniquely and is strictly concave in S.
~ii! There exists a unique optimal policy function Q ~S,A,B,s!.
~iii! At an interior solution, V is continuously differentiable in S.
Proof: Note that the utility function defined in equation ~3! is strictly concave in
its arguments. Using the assumption that YS . YD it can easily be seen that the
current value function ~i.e. current period utility as a function of ~S,S,A,B,s!! is
strictly joint concave in ~S, S!.3 The hypotheses of theorems 9.6-9.8 and 9.10 in
Stokey et al. ~1989! all hold.
We also refer the reader to Davis and Haltiwanger ~1990, p. 149! who formu-
lated a stochastic dynamic programming problem with the same properties.
The existence of a unique value function implies that we can treat the right-
hand side of ~6! as a standard maximisation problem. It should be noted that,
from the law of motion for S ~equation ~1!!, choosing Q is equivalent to choos-
ing S. The first-order condition of the maximisation problem now implies that the
optimal cleaning policy satisfies:
AU| C @~1 2 s!SYS 1 ~1 2 S!YD#YD 2 Bf P@m~1 2 S!YD#mYD
5 bEF›V ~S,A,B,s!
›S UA,B,sG . ~7!
Equation ~7! tells us that, under an optimal cleaning policy, the utility costs of
foregone output minus the utility gains from less pollution are equal to the ex-
pected utility gains resulting from an improved future environment ~because there
are more clean-production sites!, at the beginning of the next period.
It will be interesting to see how the number of workers allocated to cleaning
activities responds to a fall in the number of currently open clean sites. One could,
for example, think in this respect of the effect on optimal environmental policies,
resulting from the increasing evidence of the existence of a global greenhouse
effect. The moment we become aware of the fact that a global greenhouse effect
exists, the fraction of clean-producing plants falls immediately. In order to assess
the effects of such a fall, let us define M, the number of workers whose occupa-
tion changes from production of the composite consumption good to cleaning ac-
tivities:
Mt 5 Qt ~1 2 St 1 sSt! , ~8!
3 In fact, for strict joint concavity it suffices to assume that YS . ~1 2 Q!YD.
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thus:
›M
›S
5 2 ~1 2 s!Q .
Since
›S
›S
5 ~1 2 s! 2 ~1 2 s!Q, we can write
›M
›S
5
›S
›S
2 ~1 2 s! . ~9!
The first part of the right-hand side of ~9! is similar to the consumption smooth-
ing effect. The response to a negative wealth shock is not to decrease consump-
tion to the full extent of the reduction in wealth, but to postpone part of the
reduction in wealth at the cost of decreasing future consumption. According to
the first part of the right-hand side of ~9!, the fact that there are less clean plants
now will lead to a reduction in the quality of the future environment as well. The
reason for this is that the consumer workers are only willing to partly lower their
current consumption to compensate for the fall in S by shifting into cleaning ac-
tivities ~since ›S/›S . 0, S will decrease when S decreases!. The second term of
the right hand side of ~9! gives the direct effect of S on M. For a given Q, a fall
in S will increase the necessity to transform more dirty-production sites into clean
ones. It can easily be seen that the second term dominates. So, when the number
of currently open clean sites falls, due for example to increasing knowledge of
the existence of a global greenhouse effect, production will shift towards cleaner
production techniques, though not to the full extent of the shock.
To get a better understanding of the relationship between current consumption,
current pollution, future consumption, and future pollution, we can use ~6! in
combination with ~7! to get:4
AU| C 2 mBfP
E ~AU| C!
5 bEF~1 2 s!SYSYDDUA,B,sG . ~10!
Equation ~10! gives an expression for the stochastic marginal rate of transforma-
tion and tells us that more present consumption will be allocated to the future
when:
~1! the expected rate at which clean plants become dirty ~s! is low,
~2! the expected ratio of output in clean and dirty plants ~YS /YD! is high,
~3! the disutility from current pollution ~mBfP! is high.
4 For a derivation, see Appendix A.
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2.3 Demand and Technology Shocks
Demand shocks
When A falls, the utility of consumption decreases, and it will be optimal to trans-
fer more workers from consumption goods production to cleaning activities ~the
optimal Q will increase! and hence more workers will be reallocated from dirty
to clean plants. More clean plants are opened because the marginal utility costs
of foregone production, given by the left-hand side of ~7!, are lower when ag-
gregate demand, A, is lower. An increase in Q will, according to ~8!, lead to an
increase in the number of movers, M, by ~1 2 S 1 sS! times the change in Q.
Shocks that are perceived to be long lasting have a different impact. In that case
the future values of A on the right-hand side of ~7! will also change and ~partly!
offset the original decrease in opportunity costs.
Technology and allocation shocks
First, consider an unexpected increase in s; this is similar to a decrease of the
number of clean sites, S. If the innovation in s is considered to be persistent, the
marginal rate of transformation ~from future to current consumption! will fall,
see equation ~10!. As a result, less current consumption will be sacrificed for an
improved future environment.
An alternative form of an allocative disturbance is an increase in the ratio
YS /YD, for example due to a new energy saving technology. This will according
to ~10! lead to substitution from current consumption to reallocation activity re-
sulting in higher future consumption and a cleaner environment.
3 EVIDENCE
In environmental economics, theory seems to be ahead of empirics. While the
implications of environmental degradation, environmental policy and resource re-
strictions have been analysed in many economic frameworks ~e.g. growth, trade,
and public finance!, litte attention has been paid to the estimation of the effects
theory predicts. The main reason for this is of course not a lack of interest, but a
lack of data. While there is growing attention for economic data on environmen-
tal policy and its effects, this has not yet materialised in internationally available
and reliable data.
A more fundamental reason for the lack of empirical substantiation of envi-
ronmental economic theory is perhaps that most theories have a normative rather
than a positive character. They describe an optimal or sub-optimal world that is
often quite different from reality. Theories are therefore hard to verify with em-
pirical evidence. This does however not preclude the important role for empirics
as a means to assess the degree to which environmental policymakers act opti-
mally. In light of the present analysis, this would mean that empirical analysis
can tell us something about the optimality of current environmental policies.
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In this section we present the results of an attempt to test whether environ-
mental investments are specifically concentrated in recessions. We do this by
looking for a business-cycle effect in series of pollution abatement capital expen-
ditures ~PACE! for 10 industrial sectors of Germany,5 the Netherlands, and the
USA. The series contain yearly data and cover the period between 1971 and
1991.6 A short description of the data and their sources can be found in Appen-
dix B.
The exact specification of the tests needs some explanation. The effect of the
business cycle on PACE might be obscured because abatement technology is
partly embedded in newly acquired capital. For this so-called integrated abate-
ment technology, the assumption made in the model that the adjustment cost of
installing new abatement capital is lowest during recessions, will probably not
hold. Since investments in this kind of abatement capital are – by definition –
highly correlated with replacements and expansions of the productive capital
stock, gross investment figures can serve as a tool to distinguish between inte-
grated and end-of-line abatement investments. Ideally, the way to do this is by
using gross investments as an explanatory variable. This, however, creates a prob-
lem of multicollinearity since gross investments are correlated with the ~de-
trended! sectoral output, which serves as the business-cycle indicator in our re-
gressions. The alternative is to fix the gross investment coefficient to unity and
use the ~log of the! ratio of PACE to total gross investment, rather than PACE
itself, as the dependent variable.7 As a consequence, the hypothesis we test is not
whether total PACE ~integrated plus end-of-line! is counter-cyclical, but whether
it is more counter-cyclical ~less pro-cyclical! than total investment.
There are several ways to go about the estimation of the business-cycle effect.
The potentially most revealing way would be by estimating the relation between
PACE and sectoral output using an error correction model. In that case one could
estimate the hypothesised negative short-run relationship, while allowing for a
~probably positive! long-term link.8 The time series in our sample, however, are
not long enough to allow such division in short and long-term effects. Cointegra-
tion tests, for instance, could not establish a long-term relation between PACE
5 Germany is the territory of former West-Germany.
6 The Dutch series range from 1971 to 1990, the German data from 1975 to 1991, and the Ameri-
can data from 1973 to 1991.
7 To check whether this is not too large a restriction, we ran regressions with PACE as a dependent
variable, and gross investments next to detrended sectoral output as independent variables ~despite the
multicollinearity problem!. Then, we checked the hypothesis that all gross investment coefficients were
equal to unity. For none of the regressions this hypothesis was significantly rejected.
8 A long-term relationship could arise because a growing economy tends to raise its environmental
standards.
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and sectoral output.9 Instead of aiming at both the long and the short-run rela-
tion, we will therefore concentrate on the latter. In other words, we will focus on
the effect of upswings and downswings of the economy relative to a trend, on
the PACE/investment ratio.
The business-cycle indicator is the detrended, real sectoral output ~in logs!.
We detrended the output series using a Hoderick-Prescott ~HP! filter, with l –
the ‘shadow price’ of non-linearity – set to 100. The HP filter is a means by
which a trend can be estimated that minimises residuals, subject to a linearity
constraint.10
We tested for unit roots in the series. Table 1 summarises the results, reporting
the order of integration of the series. All PACE-ratio series, except for one Ger-
man and four Dutch sectors, are integrated of the order one. The detrended out-
put series are all stationary. Given the non-stationarity of the PACE-ratio series,
we used first differences of ~the logarithm of! all variables in the regressions.
For each country we estimated a system of equations of the form:
d~lnPACEj! 5 aj 1 bjd ~lnDOj! 1 «j ,
where DO is the detrended sectoral output and j is the sector index. Since it is
likely that unobserved macroeconomic factors affect the abatement investment de-
cision, we allow for correlation between contemporaneous disturbances across
9 After establishing that both the abatement investment variable and sectoral output are first-order
integrated, we tested for cointegration between the two variables, using the Johansen test. For 25 out
of 30 sectors, cointegrating equations could not be found.
10 See King and Rebelo ~1993! for a description of the HP filter, as well as its pros and cons.
TABLE 1 – ORDER OF INTEGRATION OF PACE-INVESTMENT RATIO AND DETRENDED
SECTORAL OUTPUT
Sector ISIC
Netherlands Germany USA
pace/inv output pace/inv output pace/inv output
food and tobacco 31 1 0 1 0 1 0
textile and leather 32 0 0 1 0 1 0
wood and wood products 33 1 0 1 0 1 0
paper products 34 1 0 1 0 1 0
chemicals 35 0 0 1 0 1 0
mineral products 36 0 0 1 0 1 0
basic metal 37 1 0 1 0 1 0
metal products 381 1 0 1 0 1 0
industrial machinery 382 1 0 1 0 1 0
electrical goods 383 1 0 1 0 1 0
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sectors. We do this by estimating the systems using the Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gressions Model ~SUR!.
The resulting coefficients – which can be interpreted as the business-cycle elas-
ticity of the PACE ratio – are presented in Table 2. It is shown that for 10 out of
30 sectors the business-cycle elasticity is significant at the 5 per cent level. For
one additional sector it is significant at the 10 per cent level. Of these significant
elasticities 8 have a negative sign, indicating a counter-cyclical pattern. The other
3 significant coefficients are positive.
TABLE 2 – ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE ON THE PACE-GROSS
INVESTMENT RATIO, IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTORS OF THE NETHERLANDS, GER-
MANY, AND THE USA
Sector ISIC
elasticity
Netherlands Germany USA
food and tobacco 31 4.66
~1.34!
2 4.03*
~ 2 2.41!
2 .0196
~ 2 .0127!
textile and leather 32 2 6.11
~ 2 .667!
2 9.95*
~ 2 2.80!
2 .259
~ 2 .0973!
wood and wood products 33 24.9*
~2.28!
1.58
~.633!
2 .568
~ 2 .396!
paper products 34 13.9
~.891!
2 8.72*
~ 2 3.10!
2 .381
~ 2 .108!
chemicals 35 2 5.67*
~ 2 2.91!
2 2.46
~ 2 1.37!
.337
~.245!
mineral products 36 7.41*
~2.49!
2 .531
~ 2 .321!
2 4.47*
~ 2 2.24!
basic metal 37 3.76
~.863!
2.19
~.882!
.575
~.709!
metal products 381 2 11.3
~ 2 .686!
2.77
~.606!
2 2.74*
~ 2 2.45!
industrial machinery 382 8.60
~.762!
2 1.81
~ 2 1.36!
2.23*
~2.06!
electrical goods 383 2 15.9*
~2.69!
5.06
~1.59!
2 2.00**
~ 2 1.63!
NOTES: t-statistics in parentheses. A single asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level.
A double asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level.
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The negative coefficients are quite evenly distributed over the countries. Ger-
many and the US have three sectors with negative coefficients, the Netherlands
two. For Germany no evidence of pro-cyclical abatement investment was found.
For two Dutch sectors ~notably wood and wood products and mineral products! a
positive elasticity was found, suggesting that end-of-line PACE in this sector is
pro-cyclical. The same is true for the American sector industrial machinery.
It is hard to detect a pattern over the sectors with significant coefficients. The
only sector with significant coefficients of equal sign, for more than one country,
is electrical goods, where for both the Netherlands and the USA a significant
elasticity was found. This could imply that the timing of abatement investment is
dominantly influenced by national factors, such as the method of regulation ~i.e.
taxes, laws, and covenants! or the compliance time-schedule imposed by the
regulator.11
For many sectors, the estimations did not yield significant results. Therefore
the outcome of our model is not unambiguously supported. There can be many
reasons for this. Besides technical reasons, like the disputable quality of the PACE
series, an important reason is possibly that the predicted counter-cyclical nature
of environmental investments is the result of a theoretical model where environ-
mental policy is set by a ‘social planner.’ The insignificant results could therefore
be explained by non-optimal timing of the deadlines in environmental programs.
If firms have to comply with regulation within a period where no recession oc-
curs, they are forced to invest in a non-optimal moment in time.
Similar considerations might explain the positive coefficients. Environmental
policy seems to have a cycle of its own, booming in times of economic prosper-
ity and withering during times of recession. If that is the case, our model would
predict that forward-looking policymakers declare environmental policy in eco-
nomic upturn, and enact this declaration once the economy slows down. When
declaration and implementation of environmental regulation are simultaneously
carried out in the boom, pro-cyclical abatement investment is likely to be found.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we showed that in a perfect market economy, where all external
effects are internalised in the prices, and which faces both demand and technol-
ogy shocks, the best time to undertake activities that improve the future environ-
ment at the cost of current output and consumption is during a recession. This is
because the opportunity costs of doing so are lowest then. There are reasons not
11 There is one other possible explanation for the insignificant results that deserves attention. This
has to do with the fact that we had to use sectoral rather than firm data. It may well be the case that
at the firm level, PACE increases after a negative demand shock but that this does not carry over to
sectoral level. Especially when firms are very heterogeneous and are mainly hit by idiosyncratic shocks
this sort of bias will be severe ~see also Caballero ~1992! on this issue!.
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to carry over this result to the real world. First of all there is no price for a clean
environment, so the government should impose restrictions on the production pro-
cess, which is indeed already done in many countries. But even when a govern-
ment is able to define an optimal level of pollution and announces it at the right
time, there may still be many market imperfections like e.g. imperfect informa-
tion and credit rationing which prevent firms from timing their pollution abate-
ment investments optimally.
To get a better view of the relevance of those market imperfections we col-
lected sectoral data on pollution abatement investments for a number of coun-
tries. We found that in more than 25 per cent of the sectors the pollution abate-
ment investments-total investment ratio moves counter-cyclical, while in 10 per
cent of the sectors this ratio moves pro-cyclical. This result suggests that there is
a potential role for government intervention. This first inquiry into the cyclical
behaviour of environmental investment raises as many questions as it answers.
Future empirical research should therefore focus on a better way to differentiate
in the data between integrated and end-of-line technology and address the ques-
tion of how the sectoral and country differences can be explained. The latter topic
would involve scrutinising environmental policy in different sectors and coun-
tries, assessing its time structure and the nature of the abatement technology it
triggers.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE STOCHASTIC MARGINAL RATE OF TRANSFORMATION
Off corners and under the optimal reallocation policy function, the value func-
tion, V, is differentiable in S with12:
›V ~S,A,B,s!
›S
5 A ~1 2 s!U| C @C# ~YS 2 ~1 2 Q!YD!
1 mBf P @P# ~1 2 s! ~1 2 Q!YD
1 b ~1 2 s! ~1 2 Q!EF›V ~S,A,B,s!
›S UA,B,sG ,
where overlined variables denote next period values.
12 For more evidence, see Lucas and Stokey ~1989!, chapter 9.
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Dividing the above equation by YD and substituting ~7! into this equation yields:
A~1 2 s!U| C @C#SYSYD 2 ~1 2 Q!D1 mBf P@P# ~1 2 s! ~1 2 Q!
1 ~1 2 s! ~1 2 Q! ~AU| C @C# 2 mBf P@P#! 5
S›V›SD
YD
.
So,
A ~1 2 s!U| C @C#
YS
YD
5
S›V›SD
YD
.
Hence,
bE 3S
›V
›SD
YD
45 bE FA ~1 2 s!U| C @C# SYSYDDG .
Now, substituting ~7! back gives:
AU| C @C# 5 bE FA ~1 2 s!U| C @C#SYSYDDUA,B,sG1 mBf P@P# ,
which can be rewritten as:
AU| C @C# 2 mBf P @P#
E ~AU| C @C#!
5 bE F~1 2 s! SYSYDDUA,B,sG .
APPENDIX B
DATA AND SOURCES
The data on gross PACE are taken from national sources, since no deliberate,
international survey of these data exists. Moreover, there are a mere handful of
countries were PACE data of the private sector are collected in a consistent man-
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ner and over a longer period. The best data can be found for the Netherlands,
Germany, and the USA. Since these data are the result of national surveys, they
cannot easily be compared. The dust has not yet settled on the discussion about
the definitions and methodology that should ideally be used for abatement invest-
ment surveys. Recently, EUROSTAT tried to synchronize the national bureaus of
statistics in the EU by suggesting a common methodology by the name SERIEE,
but it is unlikely that the German and Dutch survey will be altered to comply
with these directions in the near future.
Apart from the disparities in definitions, cross-country comparison of the data
is hindered by the different systems that are used for the sectoral breakdown.
Each country employs a different categorisation. The German breakdown is based
on the Systematik der Wirtschaftzweige, Fassung für Umweltstatistiken ~SYUM!,
the Dutch CBS uses the Standaard Bedrijfs Indeling ~SBI!, the American Bureau
of the Census based the sectoral breakdown on the Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation ~SIC!. In order to facilitate cross-country comparison, we fitted the series
in a common system of classification: the International Standard Industrial Clas-
sification ~ISIC!.13
The German series are from the Statistisches Bundesamt Investionen für Um-
weltschutz im produzierende Gewerbe and cover the period from 1975 till 1991,
on a yearly base. The Dutch data are from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek
Milieukosten van Bedrijven. The survey started in 1979, but estimations of PACE
are available from 1971 till 1990. The Bureau of the Census publication Pollu-
tion Abatement Costs and Expenditures is the source of the American PACE se-
ries. The data range from 1973 till 1991. For 1987 no data are available.
Output and investment data are from the OECD Sectoral Database. Invest-
ment is gross fixed capital formation, output is real gross sectoral production.
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